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In this chapter we investigate the taken for granted assumption that the use of analytics makes 
organizations more intelligent. We discuss how analytics influences learning from experience, one of 
the processes of organizational intelligence that informs rational choice. In particular, we revisit the 
cycle of choice, a fundamental framework in the field of organization theory, according to which 
organizations learn by making choices following a closed cycle of connections between the beliefs 
held by individuals, the individual behavior, the organizational choices, and the responses from the 
environment. We examine each case of possible breakdown in the cycle of choice and analyze 
whether the use of analytics could help avoid the breakdown. We conclude that while analytics may 
support learning from experience and avoid certain types of breakdowns, relying too much on 
analytics can also trigger new breakdowns in the cycle. We close the chapter with a reminder that 






Analytics is said to be the key for organizational success in the digital era (Davenport and 
Harris 2007), helping organizations transition from myopic to holistic (Winig 2016), become smarter 
(Davenport, Harris, and Morison 2010) and gain competitive advantage (Ransbotham, Kiron, and 
Prentice 2015). While this sounds promising enough to put analytics on the top of CIOs’ agenda 
(Gartner 2015) and to awaken the interest of researchers in the field of information systems (Chen et 
al. 2012) and management (George, Haas, and Pentland 2014), some prudence may be necessary 
before we all jump on the bandwagon bringing us straight to a data-driven wonderland. It is generally 
accepted that analytics, even though perhaps at a more mature stage, will be here to stay (Ghoshal, 
Menon, and Sarkar 2015). This implies a call to academics, to be more reflective about how the topic 
is studied and first of all to unpack assumptions that have given boost to its present popularity; in 
particular: Does analytics indeed make organizations more intelligent?   
Going back to the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March 1963) may help us in this 
inquiry. The behavioral theory of the firm has an enormous influence in the field of organizational 
intelligence, in particular through decision making and organizational adaptation. From this 
theoretical perspective, organizational intelligence has been related with making choices through two 
fundamental processes: rational calculation of alternatives and their consequences to choose the 
optimal alternative; and learning from past experience to choose among present alternatives (March 
and Olsen 1975). These two processes take place by processing information gathered internally in the 
organization and from the external environment. Rationality entails acting based on a thorough 
examination of alternatives and their consequences, which is done by gathering information, while 
organizational learning (i.e. modifying rules and actions) based on past experience (March and Olsen 
1975) is used to replace or to augment the search for information while pursuing intelligent 
organizational action. Rational choice making as well as organizational learning involve inferences 
from information, and may therefore be imperfect if organizations are bounded by cognitive limits, 
time available to search for the information, and so forth (Levinthal and March 1993; March 1994; 
Simon 1976). Analytics is believed to reduce such boundedness by supporting a complete 
examination of the choice alternatives and their consequences and in making sense of past actions and 
their consequences, due to the information processing capabilities that it offers (Clark et al. 2007; 
Davenport 2010; Winig 2016). Thus, analytics is assumed to make organizations more intelligent by 
increasing rational action and adaptation to the environment based on past experiences.  
We will investigate this assumption by using the cycle of choice framework as it has been 
developed by March and Olsen (1975). The framework is based on the ideal situation of full 
rationality and unboundedness in which intelligent organizations learn by making choices following a 
closed cycle of connections between the beliefs held by individuals, the individual behavior, the 
organizational choices, and the responses from the environment. However, given that information is 
seldom complete, difficult to interpret and often distorted, the steps that organizations take to learn are 
often broken down which results in organizations learning in a bounded and irrational way. If indeed 
analytics makes organizations more intelligent, this would mean that the use of analytics helps fixing 
the breaks in the cycle of choice. In this chapter, we take a closer look at this assumption. 
         
The technology of analytics 
  
With the term analytics we refer to the set of practices, skills, techniques and technologies, 
such as analyzing past behavior, predictive modeling and optimization, which are employed by 
organizations to extract actionable insights from data and steer decisions and actions (Bose 2009; 
Davenport and Harris 2007; Davenport et al. 2010). A common example of using analytics is the 
employment of market basket analysis (Kumar and Rao 2006) by Walmart, with the goal to learn 
from the purchase behavior of customers and to improve their sales promotions, store design, and so 
forth. 
The vast development and use of various information systems and the increased digitization 
have significantly increased the amount of data that is available to organizations (McAfee and 
Brynjolfsson 2012; Constantiou and Kallinikos 2014). Unavoidably, analytics has been established as 
one of the most influential technologies in our era (Luftman et al. 2015), as it is considered 
indispensable to leverage the value of big data (Chen, Chiang, and Storey 2012) and to make 
organizations survive and succeed in highly competitive and constantly changing environments 
(Davenport and Harris 2007). Most enthusiasm has concentrated on the argument that analytics helps 
organizations become more intelligent (Clark, Jones, and Armstrong 2007; Davenport 2010; Kiron, 
Shockley, Kruschwitz, Finch, and Haydock 2012), and transform their ways of acting from myopic 
and reactive to holistic and proactive (Winig 2016). Some criticism has been expressed regarding 
organizations investing in analytics yet failing to transform their organizational processes and to act 
based on the data analytics insights, e.g. because of lacking management support, or insufficient 
appropriate skills and understanding for how to use analytics, or unsupportive organizational culture 
(Ransbotham et al. 2015). Nevertheless, the assumption is that if organizations overcome such 
barriers, they will be able to make better informed decisions and learn from their past experience 
more effectively, thus become more intelligent and succeed with analytics (Davenport and Harris 
2007; Petrini and Pozzebon 2009). 
Analytics is closely related to decision support systems (Arnott and Pervan 2014), which 
include techniques for providing an automated solution to a certain problem with a specified set of 
data and a specific model. It is also closely related to business intelligence (Chen et al. 2012), which 
focuses on techniques for accessing, reporting and monitoring information. The main difference with 
those (older) technologies is that analytics includes more fine-tuned data mining techniques 
customized to analyze various problems, to explain why things are happening in a certain way, and to 
project what will happen next (Sharma, Reynolds, Scheepers, Seddon, and Shanks 2010). 
The study of analytics in organizations necessitates also studying the use of algorithms which 
are either included in commercial software packages such as SAS, or custom-made by data analysts in 
order to query, construct, pre-process and analyze the datasets. Acting based on analytics is related to 
an algorithmic way of managing the organization (Newell and Marabelli 2015), i.e. sensemaking, 
making choices and acting while adhering to the outcomes of algorithms. Such algorithms are often 
black-boxed, in the sense that they encapsulate the knowledge frames of the analysts that are not 
shared with the rest of the organization (Pollock and Williams 2011). As a result, organizational 
members have to sense make through representations (created by the algorithms included in the 
analytics code), and to follow actions based on analytics insights, without fully understanding how 
those representations and insights were created. 
The technology of analytics brings along the need for new skills in the organization. It has 
even necessitated the new profession of “data scientist” (Davenport and Patil 2012), that requires 
highly analytical skills and the ability to extract the correct datasets and to apply the appropriate 
techniques with the goal to find patterns in the data. To succeed in analytics, organizations need to 
employ a variety of skills (Bose 2009) including data management, technology, statistical modeling 
and analytical, business knowledge, and communication skills. 
  
Analytics and the cycle of choice 
  
In the “Behavioral Theory of the Firm” Cyert and March (1963) view organizations as 
intendedly rational systems; i.e. organizations tend to learn and adapt their behavior based on past 
experience and experience of others (Levitt and March 1988). Building on this notion, March and 
Olsen (1975) introduced a model of “complete cycle of organizational choice” (p. 149), to analyze 
organizational learning by adaptation. The model assumes that ideally organizations can act as fully 
rational and make decisions based on “perfect” information. Specifically, the rational cycle of choice 
assumes that 1) individuals make interpretations based on complete information about the 
environment; 2) changes in individual actions follow from adapting fully to these changes in 
interpretations, 3) organizational actions are informed by these individual actions, and 4) actions of 
the environment in turn are assumed to be reactions to these changed organizational actions.  
Let us introduce here an example of organizational learning that we will use in the rest of our 
analysis. Telecom is a telecommunications organization serving businesses with telephony and 
internet services. The Sales department of Telecom performs business-to-business sales by employing 
account managers. An account manager serves a set of business customers by being in frequent 
contact with them and making sure they are offered the portfolios that fit their needs. In the ideal 
situation, organizational learning in Telecom would take place while performing full cycles of choice: 
Each account manager would have complete information and could fully understand why certain 
customers churn to competitors, while others retain or even upgrade their contacts. This individual 
understanding would inform the way each account manager approaches the customers, as well as the 
pricing, portfolio roadmapping, marketing and other strategic activities that Telecom performs. The 
organizational actions would eventually influence a response from the customers (e.g. ordering a new 
portfolio), and this would feed back to the individual understanding of the account managers, and the 
cycle would continue. 
However, adapting to experience based on “perfect” information is highly problematic, as 
organizations face bounded rationality (March & Simon, 1958). For example, in the case of Telecom, 
it is often hard to have complete information to understand the way its business customers behave, 
since there are various factors that influence a company’s telecom & IT choices. March and Olsen 
(1975) consider several instances of incomplete learning, in which information processing is 
ambiguous. These cases of dysfunctional learning (Kim 1993) are represented by breakdowns in the 
cycle and include: role-constrained learning, audience learning, superstitious learning and learning 
under ambiguity. The cycle with the breakdowns is depicted in figure 1. 
  
 
Figure 1. The cycle of choice with organizational learning dysfunctions 
   
 The breakdowns in the cycle of choice emerge because the organizations often face 
difficulties in acquiring or understanding information perfectly. Since analytics helps analyze vast 
amounts of data and produces valuable insights, it can be assumed that analytics may help reduce the 
occurrence of breakdowns in the cycle, and consequently make organizations more intelligent. In the 
next paragraphs, we unpack this assumption by investigating each case of dysfunctional learning, to 
examine whether analytics will help avoid the dysfunctions, or whether it may create new ones. 
  
Learning under ambiguity 
Learning under ambiguity happens when individuals learn and modify their understanding 
while being faced with ambiguity about what happened in the environment (March & Olsen, 1975). 
Individuals change their views and beliefs but without fully understanding what happened or why it 
happened. The modified beliefs drive their individual actions which then influence organizational 
actions. Consequently, the organization learns and adapts its behavior under ambiguity. 
As analytics provides visualization capabilities and multidimensional analysis, it may support 
making sense of the environment (Chung et al. 2005), and therefore help reduce uncertainty in 
individual and organizational actions (Clark et al. 2007). In the example of Telecom, using analytics 
in Sales could help account managers have a more complete view about their customers’ behavior, 
actions and preferences, and learn what approaches and actions are needed to keep them from 
churning to competitors, and to increase sales. 
However, analytics may have a reverse effect if individuals rely too much on analytics: While 
in today’s world the problems of computer illiteracy are gone, a new illiteracy is emerging, one that 
can be called algorithmic illiteracy: even if organizational members know how to use digital tools, 
they often remain unaware of the algorithms that are encapsulated in them. This could limit their 
interpretation of analytics insights. Getting lost in the translation of analytics insights into action 
yields learning under ambiguity. 
Next to that, by creating an analytical model, people tend to treat it later as "objective" 
information, while there is a lot of subjectivity in the way models are constructed. However, 
quantitative methods also have their limits (Phillips 2003; Yoo 2015). “The factors that enter decision 
making are often so numerous and complex as well as individual specific that it is hard to conceive of 
a probability space large enough to capture all of the determining factors accurately” (Phillips 2003: 
C39). The algorithms for collecting, processing and analyzing the data are most often not created by 
the individuals who act upon them. This means that they may not encapsulate their own beliefs and 
experiences, but instead include rules based on the beliefs and biases of the data scientist who 
developed them (Nature Publishing Group 2016). By making sense of the environment only through 
data representations, individuals’ own mental representations are eventually altered and their capacity 
to learn is reduced (Constantiou and Kallinikos 2014). Think of the example of Telecom’s Sales 
department: the analytics algorithms often do not capture the personal relationship between account 
managers and their customers, while this is an important source for understanding customer behavior 
better. In that case, if account managers relied too much on the analytics, they would learn under 
ambiguity - even though they may not be aware of it. Overall, if organizations use analytics yet treat it 




         Role-constrained learning occurs when the link between individual beliefs and actions is 
broken down (March and Olsen 1975). That is to say, individuals learn and change their beliefs and 
interpretations, but they are constrained in modifying their individual behavior accordingly, because 
of their role descriptions, rigid bureaucratic rules, and standard operating procedure. Still, the 
organization in general learns, without knowing that the knowledge of individuals is different from 
what they put in action. This case of dysfunctional learning often results in organizational inertia. Let 
us go back to the example of Telecom and its Sales department: Account managers have direct 
contact with their customers and can therefore see what problems they face, when their preferences 
change and why this happens. Ideally, this should entail changing the services and prices that they 
offer to their customers, in order to make sure the customers remain satisfied and do not churn to a 
competitor. However, if the organization is organized in silos, most probably the account manager’s 
job description does not allow for influencing how the offered services are structured into portfolios, 
or how they are priced. In that case, account managers realize that they need to change the way they 
serve their customers’ needs, yet they are bounded in doing so. The individual has learned but cannot 
put this learning in action and thus limits the potential for the organization to adapt to individual local 
and situated experiences.  
         Analytics may help reduce role-constrained learning since it is expected to increase 
organizational agility and help fight inertia by providing timely information to the organization on 
how rules and routines need to be adapted (Davenport 2014). In a data-driven culture, if we assume 
that individual learning takes place with the help of analytics, the organization will be willing to 
adjust its structure, roles description and operating procedures, to reflect the changes recommended 
by the analytics insights. In that case, individual learning can be better aligned with individual actions 
and further influence the organizational actions. In the example of Telecom, we could assume that 
using analytics to analyze the customers would inform the organization that the account managers 
need to have more flexibility in the way they serve the customers the offers that they make to them, 
and would allow them to provide more customized portfolios. 
         On the other hand, by relying too much on analytics, a reversed situation might happen in 
which role-constrained learning is reinforced. If individuals are expected to act solely based on 
analytics, they may not be able to apply their intuition and beliefs drawn from their personal 
experience. Undoubtedly, the importance of intuition and personal judgment cannot be 
underestimated, especially in today’s complex, uncertain and volatile environments (Abbasi, Sarker, 
and Chiang 2016; Constantiou and Kallinikos 2014). With the expansion of big data and analytics 
technologies, it becomes highly challenging for organizations to balance data with intuition, while it 
also raises questions of accountability. For example, there can be several cases when individuals are 
expected to act based on analytics, but their intuition suggests taking a different course of action. 
Also, this could have a long term impact on the individual knowledge, since the individual stops 
learning through direct experience.  Even if analytics helps avoid one type of role-constrained 
learning, other types of role-constrained learning open up if organizations act fully based on the data 
analytics insights. 




         Audience learning occurs when individual action is not adopted or integrated by the 
organization (March and Olsen 1975). While individuals change their actions based on what they 
learned, this learning does not affect organizational learning. In the example of Telecom’s Sales 
department, one account manager may see that a specific portfolio does not represent most customers’ 
needs, and therefore focus on selling other portfolios. The account manager realizes that the 
organization is investing too much on a portfolio that is unsuccessful. However, due to the lower 
hierarchical status and the political interests of several managers who are at stake, the account 
manager cannot persuade the Marketing department to change the portfolios structure. Although 
learning has occurred on the individual level, the organization does not change anything. Next to 
being unable to influence management, it can also be just management itself that is blind to what is 
really happening on the work floor causing individual action being disconnected from the 
organizational action. 
         Analytics can help overcome audience learning in a number of ways: Individuals can use 
analytics to justify their actions to others. In a data-driven culture, analytics insights can be viewed as 
the objective information that bridges different viewpoints and brings more agreement in the 
organization (Davenport et al. 2010). In this way, individuals can influence organizational action by 
providing the figures that support their arguments and actions. Furthermore, analytics increases 
transparency in organizations (Fitzgerald 2016), by providing not only an analysis of what has 
happened in the past or what is happening in real time, but also by creating anticipations on what is 
likely to occur in the future (Hansen and Flyverbom 2015). 
Nevertheless, analytics can also stimulate audience learning. First, it can easily be the case 
that people choose to use numbers and figures only when this data is aligned with the actions that they 
want to take (McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2012). This is an example of ‘action rationality’ (Brunsson 
1982); people perform an action and later make a decision to justify the action. Individuals may 
choose to use the type of analysis that shows a pattern between an action and a reaction, but in 
practice they try to cover up the action that they would have performed anyway for other reasons. In 
the example of Telecom, account managers may choose to use analytics only when the sales 
predictions match with the approach that they wanted to take, and omit mentioning analytics insights 
that indicated collaborating with different partners, or contacting customers with whom they do not 
have a friendly relationship. In addition, people may even start playing numbers games and distorting 
the data that is stored in the information systems, in order to influence the analytics results so that 
they fit with their actions (Pachidi, Huysman and Berends 2016). For example, the account managers 
of Telecom may distort the figures regarding their sales opportunities, in order to get their bonuses 
easier. If the higher management of Telecom is blinded by using analytics to run the organization by 
numbers, they may remain unaware of the numbers games and introduce a bonus structure that does 
not correspond to the real sales actions of the account managers.  
 
Superstitious learning 
         Superstitious learning occurs when information about the causes of environmental changes is 
incomplete yet the organization assumes that environmental actions are reactions to their own actions.  
(March & Olsen, 1975; Levitt & March, 1988). Superstitious learning thus can also be referred to as 
ego-centric learning: organizations adapt to a false interpretation of environmental changes since they 
do not take exogenous causes of environmental changes into account. In the example of Telecom, the 
management of Telecom believed that the significant increase in sales was driven by their increased 
investments in marketing and customer relationship management, and overlooked the fact that small-
to-medium enterprises were paying for their services because the economy was good. After a 
financial crisis, Telecom suffered from significant losses, because their small-to-medium business 
customers churned to competitors with lower prices, despite the competitors’ lack in marketing and 
customer relationship management.  
Many studies have shown the effectiveness of analytics to provide valid insights from the 
analysis of data from the environment (Lilien, Rangaswamy, Van Bruggen, and Starke 2004; 
Tremblay, Fuller, Berndt, and Studnicki 2007). By providing more information regarding what is 
happening in the market, how competitors are behaving and how customers react, analytics has the 
potential to limit superstitious learning. For example, analytics can be used in the healthcare domain: 
association rule mining on electronic health records has proved to be effective for identifying relevant 
and accurate associations between symptoms, diseases and treatments (Chen et al. 2012).  
However, too heavy reliance on analytics could also reinforce superstitious learning. If the 
organization keeps using analytics solely to understand what organizational actions caused an 
environmental response and adapt accordingly, they may start focusing only on actions that have 
proved to be successful. Behaviors, patterns and discriminations that are inscribed in the analytics 
algorithms (Newell and Marabelli 2015) will be reinforced, while other patterns and parameters will 
be ignored (Yoo 2015). Next to that, it does not seem possible that analytics can capture all aspects of 
the environment. It is possible that certain types of patterns are not coded into algorithms. For 
example, in the case of Telecom, if the organization relies only on analytics to understand the changes 
in sales, they may ignore tacit information that cannot be coded into the algorithms, such as the plans 
of the customers to expand their businesses to new locations. Thus, by relying too much on analytics, 
organizations risk becoming path dependent, ego-centric and bounded by their very own information 
producing devices.  
 
Organizational intelligence by analytics: Closing the cycle or keeping it open?  
  
In this chapter we have taken a more reflective approach towards analytics, in order to 
examine the taken-for-granted assumption that it reduces organizations’ boundedness by facilitating 
better information to make choices and learn from it. Organizations are embracing analytics as if it is 
the holy grail of perfect information that will reduce uncertainty and increase rationality in their 
decisions and improve their learning (Clark et al. 2007), seduced by the lure to being perfectly 
rational (Cabantous and Gond 2011).  However, as organizations use analytics to act and learn more 
rationally, they run the risk of becoming even more bounded. We returned to the roots of the 
conversation on using technologies of rationality in order to improve learning from past experiences. 
For this, we revisited the cycle of choice framework developed by March & Olsen (1975), which is 
helpful to analyze learning from experience and its tendency to dysfunction as a result of making 
adaptations to imperfect information about individual beliefs and individual actions, the 
organizational actions and the responses from the environment. We argued that even though the use of 
analytics can indeed improve decision making, in case organizations rely too much on analytics, those 
dysfunctions in learning will be reinforced or reappear in different ways. This is the lure of analytics: 
while organizations think that by using analytics they become unbounded, they risk becoming even 
more bounded. A summary of our analysis is provided in table 1.  
 




Definition How analytics can close 
the cycle of choice 
How analytics can break 
down the cycle of choice 
Learning under 
ambiguity 
Individuals learn and 
modify their understanding 
while being faced with 
ambiguity about what 
happened in the 
environment. 
Analytics helps make 
sense of the environment, 
e.g. through visualization 
techniques and 
multidimensional analysis. 
Relying too much on 
analytics while treating it as 
black box results into more 
ambiguity, as the mental 
representations of 
individuals are ignored. 
Role-constrained 
learning 
Individuals learn and 
change their beliefs and 
interpretations, but they 
are constrained in 
modifying their individual 
behavior accordingly, 
because of rigid role 
Analytics may help reduce 
role-constrained learning, 
since it is expected to 
increase organizational 
agility and help fight 
inertia, by providing 
timely information to the 
If individuals are expected 
to act solely based on 
analytics, they may not be 
able to apply their intuition 
and beliefs, and eventually 
stop learning through direct 
experience. 
descriptions, bureaucratic 
rules and standard 
operating procedures. 
organization on how rules 




Audience learning occurs 
when individual action  is 
not adopted or integrated 
by the organization. 
Individuals can use 
analytics to justify their 
actions to the 
organization, while 
analytics also increases 
transparency regarding 
what is happening on the 
work floor. 
Organizational members 
may use analytics only 
when the data is aligned 
with the actions that they 
want to take, or may even 
play numbers games. 
Management can be blinded 
by analytics and overlook 
what actually happens on 
the work floor. 
Superstitious 
learning 
Information about the 
causes of environmental 
changes is incomplete yet 
the organization assumes 
that these changes are 
caused by its own actions. 
By providing more 
information regarding 
what is happening in the 
market, how competitors 
are behaving and how 
customers react, analytics 
has the potential to limit 
superstitious learning. 
By relying too much on 
analytics, organizations risk 
becoming path dependent 
and bounded by their very 
own information producing 
devices. 
 
Whether analytics increases or decreases organizational intelligence, it is questionable 
anyway why we would want to develop organizations that learn perfectly and act fully rationally. 
Acting based on analytics by definition entails employing a technology of rationality, i.e. acting upon 
a model-based assessment of the likelihoods of possible future ends and of pre-established 
preferences among those ends (March 2006). However, in order to innovate and to survive in highly 
volatile environments, organizations also need to apply technologies of foolishness (March 1988), i.e. 
being open to new alternatives by employing playfulness, trial and error, and improvisation. Acting 
irrationally can sometimes lead to great outcomes for the organization. The organization needs to 
have some Don Quixote’s, the people who may seem crazy by deviating from the expected behavior 
and remaining open to unexpected consequences (March and Weil 2009). By acting solely based on 
analytics in the hope to close the learning cycle, organizations risk losing the occurrence of outliers to 
learn from, the success of the unexpected, the plurality of different viewpoints, the generous insights 
by Steve Jobs and all other less known Don Quixote’s out there. Thus, not only should organizations  
reduce their high expectations regarding what analytics brings to organizational intelligence, it would 
be smart to include technologies of foolishness when engaging in learning. To cite March: 
“Individuals and organizations need ways of doing things for which they have no good reason. Not 
always. Not usually. But sometimes. They need to act before they think.” (March 1988 :259) Hence, 
even though with the use of analytics the cycle of choice can be closed to a certain degree, aiming for 
a closed circle would be counterproductive.  
One thought before closing this chapter concerns our choice to use the cycle of Choice 
(March and Olsen 1975) as an analytical framework while thinking about analytics. This framework 
corresponds to the most popular assumption taken by the proponents of analytics, regarding making 
organizations more intelligent. Analyzing historical data collected from internal and external (to the 
organization) information systems is assumed to increase rationality and learning from experiences, 
and thus to perform complete cycles of choice. It was useful to examine whether this is true, in order 
to be more reflective about the enthusiasm by scholars and practitioners in advocating analytics as the 
holy grail to achieving organizational intelligence. We found the cycle a useful analytical framework 
for scholars and practitioners to think about analytics, and we believe that it could be revisited and 
used as a framework to think about other similar technologies. Further than that, revisiting this old 
framework brings back the never ending discussions regarding rationality and foolishness in 
organizations, and the balance between exploration and exploitation. It refreshes the conversation on 
the information processing perspective, which has become taken-for-granted in achieving 
organizational success.  
Our analysis questions basic assumptions regarding why and how information systems should 
be used in organizations, and serves as a reminder that we need to develop technologies that not 
always make us smarter, but also afford some foolishness. Acknowledging that we do not want to 
fully close the circle of choice, we hope to see future research investigating how technologies such as 
analytics and big data, so far approached with the goal to increase rationality, could increase creativity 
and innovation. For example, scholars should consider how we could use data mining techniques to 
experiment with the outliers, or how we could use big data to play with novel, unanticipated insights 
(George et al. 2014; Pentland 2014). We hope that our reflection triggers the readers to stop thinking 
about analytics solely as the means to organizational intelligence. Instead, it is time to explore how 
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